Licensing regulations and the Americans With Disabilities Act

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/nyregion/taxi-fleet-in-new-york-is-inadequate-for-wheelchair-users-judge-rules.html

Recently, at the above link, the New York Times reported that a federal judge ruled that the city of New York must start approving medallions so that more taxis were wheelchair accessible. After reading the article, I decided to go to the case itself, Noel V. New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, 2011 WL 6747466 (S.D. N.Y. December 23, 2011). In this case, the plaintiffs sued the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission because their regulations were not set up to approve a sufficient number of taxis that were wheelchair accessible. Interestingly enough, the Commission defended on the grounds that title II of the ADA did not apply to them. There were two possible ways title II could apply.  First, there is a section of title II that applies to public entities operating a demand responsive system. Second, and more common, is that title II demands that governmental entities be accessible to persons with disabilities. With respect to the first issue, the court decided that the Commission was not operating a demand responsive system (which would have required that each and every taxi be wheelchair accessible), and therefore, the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act pertaining to a demand responsive system did not apply. However, the court did find that the Commission was a public entity subject to title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and therefore, its operations must be accessible to persons with disabilities. The Commission admitted that it had both the ability and authority to provide more wheelchair accessible vehicles but simply had chosen not to do so. Therefore, only 232 taxi cabs in New York out of 13,237 were accessible to individuals using wheelchairs. The court held that the Commission did not provide meaningful access to this public benefit. Therefore the court ordered that the Commission to propose a comprehensive plan that provides meaningful access to taxi services for passengers using wheelchairs. The plan must include targeted goals and standards as well as anticipated measurable results. Furthermore, until such a plan was proposed and approved by the court, all new taxi medallions sold or new street hail livery licenses or permits issued by the Commission must be for wheelchair accessible vehicles. No doubt this is a great victory for persons with disabilities.

However the question becomes where did the “meaningful access” standard come from? That, is an interesting story. Noel relies on another case, Henrietta D v. Guilani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), where the court held that a city program that provided federal and state benefits for individuals suffering from AIDS was run in such a way that the beneficiaries of that program lacked meaningful access to it. This decision relied on Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), a Rehabilitation Act case, which upheld a Tennessee reduction of annual inpatient hospital days that the Tennessee Medicaid program would pay. It is there that the, “meaningful access” phrase first appears. It appears in the context of saying that the reduction in hospital stays is a neutral decision and does not impact upon whether a person with a disability had meaningful access to the program. Therefore, one can see that in Noel the term, “meaningful access” is being used quite a bit differently than what it had been used in prior case law.

What does this all mean? It is very strange in a way. The Commission never argued at the lower level that summary judgment should be denied because a question of fact existed as to whether the program and activities of the Commission were accessible to persons with disabilities or whether there were other ways that could be formulated so that the program and activities of the Commission could be accessible to persons with disabilities, wheelchair users in this case. Perhaps, an appeal might claim that the lower court did not apply the proper legal standard (that is, “meaningful access” is being used in this case in a way different than existing precedent, and therefore, the argument goes that an appellate court should send the case back down with the correct legal standard, whatever that may be).

At any rate, a deceptively complex case, that bears following in the future. It also serves notice on regulatory bodies that their regulations should be formulated in such a way that they do not have a disparate impact on (screen out) persons with disabilities. Failure to do so, could subject the agency to a title II suit along the lines described here.

Update: This week, week of March 19, the city received a stay from the Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals with respect to the District Court decision referenced here. The city has also made clear that it will be appealing the decision, perhaps along the lines discussed here.