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Perez v. MBA and it’s Impact on the ADA Universe: Huge and Starting with new DOT Final Regulations

March 18, 2015 By William Goren 1 Comment

I
Introduction
Sometimes a case can have a huge impact on the ADA universe even though it is not an ADA case at all. Gross v. FBL Financial Services 557 U.S. 167 (2009) is one such case and today’s case is another. As is my usual practice, the blog entry has been divided into several categories: introduction; today’s case; the concurring opinions; the final rule from the Department of Transportation pertaining to transportation for individuals with disabilities…; The specific provisions of the final rule; highlights of the language of the final rule; why Perez matters; the appendix; and takeaways. The reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories.

II
Today’s Case

Today’s case, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, a unanimous decision from the United States Supreme Court decided on March 9, 2015 is another such case. In this case, the Department of Labor’s wage and hour division issued letters stating that it was their opinion that mortgage loan officers do not qualify for the administrative exemption to overtime pay requirements under the fair labor standards act. In 2006, the wage and hour division completely reversed course. In 2010, they reversed again. MBA file suit alleging that under the jurisprudence of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, when an agency does something like this, it must go through the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment procedures.

The United States Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion, said the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act were very clear when it states that the notice and comment requirement does not apply to interpretive rules, general statement of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. Therefore, an agency was not required to go through the notice and comment procedures when it issues interpretive rules regardless of its interpretation in the past, and the line of cases from the US Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia saying otherwise was in error.

In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion made a few additional critical points that are useful here. First, interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process. Second, prior case law from the United States Supreme Court merely meant that an agency may only change its interpretation if the revised interpretation is consistent with the underlying regulations and was not in support of the line of cases stating otherwise from the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Third, the Administrative Procedure Act does require an agency to provide more substantial justification when a new policy rests upon factual finding contradicting those underlying a prior policy or when a prior policy has led to serious reliance interests. To ignore both of those situations would be arbitrary and capricious.

III
The Concurring Opinions

That all may be true, but what is extremely significant about this case is the concurring opinions. The concurring opinions reveal that there are at least three justices of the United States Supreme Court that would go even further. To their view, it is simply not enough to say that interpretive rules do not have the effect of law because while they do not have the effect of law, there is a line of cases from the United States Supreme Court that requires deference to agency interpretations of regulations unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. The three justices (Scalia and Thomas explicitly and Alito signifying he is leaning that way), believe that doctrine should be overruled as well, which brings us to….

IV
The Final Rule from the Department Of Transportation Pertaining to Transportation for Individuals with Disabilities; Reasonable Modification of Policies and Practices

On March 13, 2015, the Department of Transportation issued a final rule pertaining to Transportation for Individuals with Disabilities; Reasonable Modification of Policies and Practices. The final rule requires public transportation entities to make reasonable modifications/accommodation to their policies, practices, and procedures in order to ensure program accessibility. The necessity for the rules was mandated by case law that was finding against the Department of Transportation by holding that transportation entities were not obligated to make such modifications under the ADA because the Department of Transportation had no regulations explicitly requiring transportation entities to make reasonable modifications.

V
The Specific Provisions of the Final Rule:

1. Recipients of federal financial assistance are required to provide reasonable accommodation to policies, practices, or procedures when the accommodations are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability unless there exist a fundamental alteration to the nature of the service, program, or activity or there exist an undue financial and administrative burden.

What is interesting about this particular provision of the final rule is the requirement that a defense exist where there exist an undue financial AND administrative burden. When I first saw this, I said to myself this can’t be right and so I double checked it. It turns out that under the implementing regulations for title I of the ADA, it is clear that undue hardship, which is a title I term, can either be an undue hardship in the financial sense OR in the logistical sense. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2). With respect to title III’s implementing regulations, it is clear that undue burden can be either financial or logistical. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). While I don’t have it handy at the moment, there is plenty of case law to support that undue hardship can either be financial or logistical and that undue burden under title II can either be financial or logistical. Nevertheless, the final regulations dealing with title II of the ADA, 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) do refer to undue financial AND administrative burdens. It doesn’t seem that the Department of Transportation believes that both have to be satisfied because otherwise much of its appendix, more on that later, to this final rule would not make any sense.

2. Those providing public transportation, including fixed route, demand responsive, and complementary paratransit services must implement their own processes for making decisions on providing reasonable modification to their policies and practices. There is freedom on how to go about it but certain things have to happen. First, information about the process and how to use it must be readily available to the public, including persons with disabilities. Second, the process must allow for accessible means by which persons with disabilities can request reasonable modifications/accommodations. Third, the process must also provide for those situations where an advance request and determination is not feasible.

3. Requested modification can be denied in any of three different situations: a fundamental alteration of the provider’s services exist; providing the modification results in a direct threat to the health or safety of others; providing the accommodation is not necessary to permit the passenger to use the entity’s services for their intended purpose in a nondiscriminatory fashion (that is, while the modification might make things more convenient for the passenger, the passenger could nevertheless use the services in a nondiscriminatory manner without the modification).

4. All public and private entities providing these transportation services must have a complaint process in place. The Department of Transportation will look to take action where a complaint process is not in place, the complaint process is not being operated properly, the complaint process is not being operated in good faith, or a particular case raises a federal interest.

VI
Highlights of The Language of the Final Rule

5. With respect to an entity receiving federal financial assistance, what is really interesting is that the final rule itself uses a bit of different language. The final rule talks about reasonable accommodations and not reasonable modifications. Reasonable accommodations is a title I term, whereas reasonable modifications are the terms used in title II and title III. Nevertheless, the final rule specifically uses the term reasonable accommodations but then says that reasonable accommodations mean the same thing as reasonable modifications under title II of the ADA and not reasonable accommodations under title I of the ADA. I find this all strange. I do not know why the Department of Transportation does not stick with the term reasonable modifications instead of going through a complicated endeavor to use the term reasonable accommodations in the final rule.

6. Whether a public entity or a private entity, it must have at least one person designated to coordinate its efforts to comply with nondiscrimination on the part of persons with disabilities (recipients of federal financial assistance due to § 504 regulations should already have such a person).

7. The final rule specifically defines origin to destination service and mandates that where an ADA paratransit operator chooses curb to curb service as the primary means of providing service, assistance must be provided to passengers with disabilities beyond the curb unless such assistance results in a fundamental alteration or a direct threat.

8. Public and private entities must give priority to methods offering services, programs, and activities to qualified individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the person with a disability.

9. Public entities have until July 13, 2015 to get a complaint process in place.

10. In determining whether to grant a requested modification, public entities shall be guided by the provisions of appendix E, coming up next.

VII
Why Perez Matters

11. Perez matters because in the world of the ADA you have guidances and interpretive rules everywhere. The decision puts everyone on notice that the guidances and interpretive rules are at considerable risk of subsequent litigation. Further, calling a guidance something else, such as in this case attaching an appendix, is also at considerable risk.

VIII
The Appendix:

12. The provisions of the final rule clearly suggests that the appendix only applies to public entities (See new 49 C.F.R. 37.169(d)), yet the appendix itself doesn’t seem to make that distinction.

13. The appendix actually uses the term, “…explains the department’s interpretation of §§ 37.5(g) and 37.169 [and] is intended to be used as the official position of the department concerning the meaning and implementation of these provisions.”

Two points here. First, the rule as literally set up seems to suggest that private entities do not have to worry about the appendix. Second, it is clear that the appendix is the Department of Transportation’s interpretation of the final rule and as such may run into the problem of whether this interpretation will be granted deference per Scalia, Thomas, and presumably Alito, if their views prevail.

14. Things that the Department of Transportation will consider reasonable modifications:

A. A passenger’s request for a paratransit driver to walk over a pathway that has not been fully cleared of snow and ice where such request is to help the passenger with a disability navigate the pathway;

B. If snow or icy conditions at a bus stop make it difficult or impossible for a fixed route passenger with a disability to get to the lift or for the lift to deploy, moving the bus to a cleared area for boarding if moving the bus is available within reasonable proximity to the stop;

C. A paratransit rider’s request to be picked up at home but not at the front door of his or her home or to be dropped off at an entrance requested by a passenger to a frequently visited public place with multiple entrances so long as the requested pickup location did not pose a direct threat;

D. Picking up a paratransit passenger on private property in a gated community or parking lot, mobile home community, business or governmental facility where vehicle access requires it also pass through a security barrier so long as every reasonable effort to gain access to that area has been made;

E. Granting a passenger’s request for a driver to position the vehicle to avoid obstruction to the passenger’s ability to enter or leave the vehicle at a designated stop location, such as park cars, snowbanks, and construction so long as the vehicle avoiding the obstruction does not pose a direct threat;

F. Granting a passenger’s request for transit personnel to handle the fare when the passenger with a disability cannot pay the fare by the generally established means;

G. Granting a passenger with diabetes or another medical condition request to eat or drink aboard a vehicle or in a transit facility in order to avoid adverse health consequences;

H. Granting a passenger’s request to take medication while aboard a fixed route or paratransit vehicle or in a transit facility;

I. Granting a wheelchair user’s request aboard a fixed route or paratransit vehicle separately from his or her device when the occupied weight of the device exceed the design load of the vehicle lift;

J. A passenger’s request for the driver to open an exterior entry door to a building to provide boarding and/or alighting assistance to a passenger with a disability so long as such assistance does not pose a direct threat or leave the vehicle unattended or out of visual observation for a lengthy period of time;

K. A passenger requesting that a paratransit vehicle navigate to a pickup point where it is difficult to maneuver a vehicle so long as the passenger does not expose the vehicle to a hazard posing a direct threat.

L. A paratransit passenger’s request for a driver to help him or her navigate an incline with the passenger’s wheel device. Same goes for assistance in traversing a difficult sidewalk or getting around obstacles between the vehicle and a door to a passenger’s house or destination unless such assistance results in a direct threat or leaves the vehicle unattended or out of visual observation for a lengthy period of time.

M. A passenger’s request to be assisted from his or her door to a vehicle during extreme weather conditions so long as the driver leaving the vehicle to assist would not pose a direct threat or leave the vehicle unattended or out of visual observation for a lengthy period of time;

N. Where a passenger’s request for assistance means that the driver will need to leave passengers aboard a vehicle unattended or out of visual observation for a lengthy period of time, unless accommodating the request is a direct threat to the health or safety of the unattended passengers, which the Department of Transportation says “could involve direct threat,” in that situation.

The use of the term “could involve direct threat…,” Is extremely problematic in terms of what it might mean.

O. Accommodating a passenger with a disability on a return trip when they did not need that assistance on the initial trip;

P. A passenger’s request for a telephone call five minutes in advance or at time of vehicle arrival.

What is not a reasonable modification/accommodation:

1. Fixed route operators having to establish flag stop or route deviation policies;

2. Reaching into pockets or backpacks of the passenger with a disability in order to extract the fare;

3. A paratransit passenger’s request for special equipment so long as that requested equipment is not required by the ADA or Department of Transportation rules. Same goes for a dedicated vehicle or a specific type or appearance of vehicle;

4. A person’s request to have the transportation provider travel outside of its service area or to operate outside of its operating hours;

5. Providing a personal care attendant or a personal care attendant services to meet the needs of passengers with disabilities on paratransit or fixed route trips;

6. Providing the passenger with a disability free fixed route or paratransit driver services;

7. Being asked to follow a path to a pickup or drop-off point that exposes the vehicle and its occupant to hazards;

8. A passenger’s request for a specific driver;

9. A passenger’s request for a fixed route or paratransit driver to assist with luggage or packages where it is not the normal policy or practice of the transportation agency to do that;

10. A paratransit passenger’s request not to ride with certain riders.

11. Unless an emergency exists, a passenger’s request for a driver to lift the passenger out of his or her mobility device.

Optional

1. Granting a paratransit passenger’s request for a driver to make an intermediate stop where the driver would be required to wait is something the paratransit operator can or cannot do at their option.

Wild West

1. A paratransit or fixed route passenger’s request that the driver take charge of the service animal may be denied. Caring for a service animal is the responsibility of the passenger or a personal care assistant.

True enough. But what does caring for the animal mean. See this blog entry of mine.

IX
Takeaways:

1. Guidances and interpretive rules when it comes to the world of the ADA are absolutely everywhere. Perez is putting everyone on notice that the ability of agencies to issue the guidances and interpretive rules is unfettered, but the days of such interpretive guidances and rules being given a great deal of discretion by the court may be coming to an end. Thus, agencies may have won the battle in Perez, but may be on the verge of losing the war.

2. These Department of Transportation regulations may be the perfect case for the Supreme Court to evaluate whether interpretive rules and guidances must be given deference by the courts. Apendix E is clearly an interpretive rule regardless of what you might call it, and the very nature of the rule takes away the individual case by case analysis that the ADA requires.

3. Apendix E on its face only applies to public entities. Therefore, if you are a private entity, a plausible argument can certainly be made that appendix E is not applicable. Also, nothing in the final regulation seems to suggest that appendix E would apply to a private entity accepting federal funds either.

4. Despite what the title II regulations say, I am not aware of any case law that says for something to be an undue burden it has to be both financial and administrative.

5. As I have mentioned before, with rare exceptions, I don’t like guidances and interpretive rules for many reasons. First, the guidances and interpretive rules avoid the notice and commenting process of the Administrative Procedure Act. Second, such guidances and rules can create their own problems (example-what does caring for an animal mean? What does it mean to say that an intermediate stop is optional but could rise to a fundamental alteration?). Finally, the guidances and rules are used as a crutch by attorneys so that attorneys don’t have to go through the individual analysis to figure out whether an undue burden/hardship or fundamental alteration exists. It won’t surprise me in the least if appendix E is used as a vehicle to test whether the doctrine of giving deference to interpretive rules and guidances is still good law.

Filed Under: ADA, Final Federal Regulations, General, Guidances, Proposed Federal Regulations, Rehabilitation Act, Title II, Title III Tagged With: 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, 28 C.F.R. § 36.303, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2, ADA, administrative procedure act, Americans with Disabilities Act, appendix, appendix E, deference to agency interpretation, Department of Transportation, Department of Transportation final rules, direct threat, final rules, fixed route, fundamental alteration, gross v. FBL financial services, guidances, interpretive rules, Justice Alito, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, paratransit, passenger, Perez v. mortgage bankers Association, private entities, public entity, public transportation, reasonable accommodations, reasonable modifications, requested accommodation, Requested modification, title I, title II, title III, transportation for individuals with disabilities: reasonable modification of policies and practices, undue burden, undue financial and administrative burden, undue hardship

Sovereign immunity principles outside of sovereign immunity claims and the importance of self-evaluation and transition plans

October 18, 2012 By William Goren 3 Comments

In a previous blog entry, I talked about the principle of sovereign immunity as it applies to persons with disabilities. As mentioned in that blog entry, a state, including an arm of the state, is not going to be forced to waive its sovereign immunity with respect to disability discrimination in employment matters. With respect to title II matters, that is a bit more complicated because as we discussed previously, it is going to depend upon the facts of the case. To recap, before a state can be forced to waive its sovereign immunity, the court would have to find that Congress specifically stated that states will waive their sovereign immunity and that the particular law at issue is an appropriate enforcement of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. That is, that law must be proportional to the harm being redressed. As mentioned in that previous blog entry above, it will come down to what protected class the person is in for purposes of equal protection jurisprudence. The higher the class, the more likely the forced waiver of sovereign immunity is to survive.

Principles discussed in that blog entry also apply to other areas as well. For example, it could be a situation where an entity does not defend based on sovereign immunity but says that the law itself is unconstitutional because it is not an appropriate enforcement of the equal protection clause. That was the case in Mason v. City of Huntsville, Alabama, _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2012 WL 4815518 (N.D. Ala. October 10, 2012). In that case, two plaintiffs, both residents of Huntsville Alabama, sued the city of Huntsville Alabama for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at *1. In particular, they claimed that several locations owned, operated and maintained by the city of Huntsville were not accessible to them. Id. at *2-3. They sought attorney fees and injunctive relief and costs. Id. at *1. While the city of Huntsville did not defend on the grounds of sovereign immunity (it couldn’t because cities are not sovereigns) ( see Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001)), it did claim that title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act went too far. That is, with respect to the violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act that the plaintiff were alleging, title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not a proportionate response to the harm seeking to be redressed and therefore was unconstitutional. Mason 2012 WL 4815518 at *6.

The court broke down the plaintiffs claims into three different categories: sidewalks, curb ramps, and parking; municipal administration facilities; and entertainment and recreation venues. Id. at *8. With respect to sidewalks, curb ramps, and parking, the first question the court had to address was whether the Americans with Disabilities Act applied to that in the first place. The court, relying on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which covers anything that a public entity does, said that the Americans with Disabilities Act does apply to sidewalks, curb ramps, and parking. Id. Next, you have to figure out whether sidewalks, curb ramps, and parking were subject to rational basis review or something higher. The court noted that sidewalks, ramps, and parking areas are used primarily to facilitate the public transportation of people, goods and commerce, but they also could be used for the purposes of assembly. Id. at *9. In this case, while the plaintiff alluded to the First Amendment (the assembly piece) in their response to the motion to dismiss, they did not plead any such facts. Id. Accordingly, the court said that only rational basis scrutiny is implicated when analyzing the question of sidewalks, curb ramps, and parking areas. Id.

Since only rational basis was indicated, that means that the plaintiff’s lost with respect to whether title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act was a proportional response to the harm being redressed? Not so fast, the court said. Turning to a House report, the court noted that people with disabilitie have suffered harms resulting from construction of transportation, architecture and communication barriers, and that transportation was the critical piece that enables persons with disabilities to be integrated into the mainstream of society. Id. at *10. Further, accessible transportation promotes the self-reliance and self-sufficiency of people with disabilities that enables them to get to work and vote thereby allowing them to exercise their rights and obligations as citizens. Id. Accordingly, despite sidewalks, curbs, and parking areas constructed after 1992 being in the rational basis class, the court found that title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act was a proportional response to the harm being redressed, and therefore, was within congressional authority to enact. Id. at *11.

With respect to municipal administration facilities, the court said that denying the use of municipal administration facilities based on a person having a disability implicated fundamental rights to speech, assembly and association. Id. Therefore, heightened scrutiny applied to the issue of municipal administration facilities discriminating based on disability. Id. Heightened scrutiny is a very difficult standard to meet and is rarely met. That is, the defendant would have to show that there were grave and immediate dangers to interests that the state may lawfully protect, which they couldn’t do. Id. Accordingly, the court found that title II with respect to municipal administration facilities, was a proportional response to the harm seeking to be redressed. Id.

With respect to entertainment and recreation venues, the the court noted that the class at issue might vary depending on whether some of those facilities house educational programs and library resources because in the 11th circuit, there is a vital, though not fundamental, right of equal access to education. Id. at *12. However, the plaintiffs did not claim that any educational program for library resources were involved. Id. The court, relying on another case, from the northern district of Georgia, said that while there was no separate constitutional right to access parks and recreation facilities, nevertheless, a person could allege that such discrimination was irrational. Id. Accordingly, entertainment and recreation venues fell in the rational basis classification. Id. Once again, the plaintiff prevailed even though rational basis is the class at issue. In particular, the court noted that title III prohibits discrimination and that it would be completely illogical for Congress to prohibit discrimination in places of public accommodations, title III, but allow it for public entities, title II. Id. Such an inconsistency would also contravene the purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. Finally, because title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act allows a governmental entity a great deal of flexibility when it comes to carrying out its provisions of the regulations implementing title II, a public entity is not unduly burdened by the statutory requirements. Id. Accordingly, the court found that title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act was a proportional exercise of congressional power even though entertainment and recreational venues would be in the rational basis class. Id.

This case is also notable for something else as well. That is, the plaintiffs allege that there was an independent violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act because the city of Huntsville Alabama, as is common to public entities, did not do a self-evaluation plan or develop a transition plan per the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act. While the court said that such a failure did not give rise to an independent cause of action for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act because the DOJ regulations were not from an express mandate of the ADA, it could be used as evidence of overall ADA noncompliance. Id. at *14-15.

Thoughts: As noted in the previous blog entry, equal protection jurisprudence breaks down into what class you fall into. It used to be that those classes were rigid. However, those classes are breaking down. For example, you are now seeing cases throwing out laws even if they are subject to rational basis review. In addition to this case, which didn’t throw out a law but rather allowed it (flip side of the same principle), one could also look at the cases throwing out restrictions against gays and lesbians. Frequently, those restrictions are being thrown out saying that the restrictions are just subject to rational review and that the restrictions are irrational and therefore unconstitutional. The problem with equal protection jurisprudence with respect to dividing people into classes is that it is inherently divisive. That is, what if one group of people is in the lowest class while other groups of people are in higher classes, especially where a group of people may be in the rational basis class (a much harder class than the others for challengers). Also, since persons with disabilities may change the classification depending on the facts, one wonders if the classification system may be a bit arbitrary. In short, it will be interesting to see how the classification systems holds up or evolves over time. For example, Justice Stevens, now retired, has written in the past that this whole system of equal protection jurisprudence was problematic. Since the system has been around for a long time, one wonders if it would be replaced and if so by what?

While a specific cause of action for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act for not doing a self-evaluation plan for transition plan is not in play under this case, this case does suggest that it would be a good idea for the public entity to review their programs and do a self-evaluation plan and transition plan even though the deadline for doing that has long passed, early 1990’s, so as to prevent a plaintiff from bringing forth the failure to do so as evidence of overall noncompliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Filed Under: Federal Cases, Final Federal Regulations, Rehabilitation Act, Title I, Title II Tagged With: 14th amendment, accessible, accessible transportation, ADA, Americans with Disabilities Act, appropriate enforcement, appropriate enforcement of equal protection clause, arm of the state, attorney fees, congressional authority, costs, covering anything that a public entity does, curb ramps, Department of Justice regulations, disability discrimination, divisive, DOJ regulations, entertainment and recreation venues, equal protection, equal protection clause, equal protection jurisprudence, evidence of overall ADA noncompliance, First Amendment, forced waiver, forced waiver of sovereign immunity, fundamental rights, harm seeking to be redressed, heightened scrutiny, Huntsville Alabama, independent cause of action, injunctive relief, integration of persons with disabilities, Irrational, irrational discrimination, justice Stevens, municipal administration facility, northern district of Georgia, parking, persons with disabilities, proportionate response, public accommodation, public entities, public transportation, rational basis, rational basis class, rational basis review, rehabilitation act, rehabilitation act of 1973, self-evaluation plan, sidewalk, sovereign immunity, title I, title II, transition plan, unconstitutional, vital right, waiving sovereign immunity

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  • Legal pad radio show interview first run Wednesday, October 23rd at 7:30am.; Re-airs at Saturday, October 26th at 3:30pm and Monday, October 28th at 9am
  • Let's Talk About Arbitration blog entry and other entries featured on the Illinois business litigator blog
  • MH issues and the State Bar
  • Oral Argument in Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco
  • PBS News Hour piece discussing accessibility of amusement parks for persons with disabilities
  • Reflections on the development of disability as a diversity concern in the legal profession
  • SCOTUS blog references Endrew oral argument blog entry
  • SCOTUS Blog references Fry decided blog entry
  • SCOTUS Blog referencing blog entry that Reviews Supreme Court cases and the upcoming Supreme Court cases vis a vis the ADA/disability rights
  • Sevorson decision analyzed
  • Sheehan decision
  • Trimble v. Kroger
  • What's wrong with this job description blog entry featured in December 2015 employment Law blog carnival
  • When to grant more leave after FMLA is exhausted
  • Why ADA is a Good Law

Presentations of interest

  • ADA Hot Issues: Essential Function, Attendance, and Reassignment
  • ADA Hot Issues: Pregnancy, Reassignment, and Legal Issues of Buying Inaccessible Technology
  • Let's Count the Ways the ADA Impacts Your Law Practice
  • Understanding the Americans with Disabilities Act, Fourth Edition – Hot Off the Press – A Brown Bag Series

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