arrests

Reconsider Using Graham v. Connor as the Basis for Training Police on Excessive Force

September 12, 2018 by William Goren 1 Comment

Before starting the blog entry of the week, I want to wish all my Jewish brethren a happy new year. Here is hoping that it is a healthy, happy, and successful new year for you and your families.

It seems in Georgia that there is an epidemic of police shootings. In fact, I read the other day in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, that police shootings in Georgia are way above the pace in previous years. That article also mentioned that Graham v. Connor was the seminal case for training police forces on whether force is excessive. So, I pulled Graham v. Connor. When I did that, it became pretty obvious to me that if this particular case is the one being used for training police on excessive force, then people doing the training really need to reconsider. This blog entry will talk about that case, explain why it is not a good idea for trainers to be using this case as the vehicle for training police forces on excessive force, and then will talk about a case that trainers may want to use instead. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories, and they are: Graham v. Connor; Graham v. Connor looked familiar; Graham v. Connor thoughts; Vos v. City of Newport Beach introduction and facts; Vos court’s reasoning-excessive force; Vos court’s reasoning-ADA; and takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the sections of the blog entry.

Graham v. Connor

In Graham v. Connor, the petitioner, a type I diabetic, asked his friend to drive him to a convenience store to purchase orange juice to counteract the onset of insulin reaction. Upon entering the store and seeing the number of people ahead of them, he hurried out and asked his friend to drive him to a friend’s house instead. A police officer became suspicious after seeing Graham hastily enter and leave the store, and so he followed the car. He made an investigative stop, ordering Graham to wait while he found out what had happened in the store. Backup police officers arrived on the scene, handcuffed Graham, and ignored or rebuffed attempts to explain and treat Graham’s condition. During the encounter, Graham sustained multiple injuries. Once the police officer learned that nothing that happened in the store, he was released.

As the court put it:

On November 12, 1984, Graham, a diabetic, felt the onset of an insulin reaction. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a nearby convenience store so he could purchase some orange juice to counteract the reaction. Berry agreed, but when Graham entered the store, he saw a number of people ahead of him in the checkout 3899 *38910 line. Concerned about the delay, he hurried out of the store and asked Berry to drive him to a friend’s house instead.

Respondent Connor, an officer of the Charlotte, North Carolina, Police Department, saw Graham hastily enter and leave the store. The officer became suspicious that something was amiss and followed Berry’s car. About one-half mile from the store, he made an investigative stop. Although Berry told Connor that Graham was simply suffering from a “sugar reaction,” the officer ordered Berry and Graham to wait while he found out what, if anything, had happened at the convenience store. When Officer Connor returned to his patrol car to call for backup assistance, Graham got out of the car, ran around it twice, and finally sat down on the curb, where he passed out briefly.

In the ensuing confusion, a number of other Charlotte police officers arrived on the scene in response to Officer Connor’s request for backup. One of the officers rolled Graham over on the sidewalk and cuffed his hands tightly behind his back, ignoring Berry’s pleas to get him some sugar. Another officer said: “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the M. F. but drunk. Lock the S. B. up.” App. 42. Several officers then lifted Graham up from behind, carried him over to Berry’s car, and placed him face down on its hood. Regaining consciousness, Graham asked the officers to check in his wallet for a diabetic decal that he carried. In response, one of the officers told him to “shut up” and shoved his face down against the hood of the car. Four officers grabbed Graham and threw him headfirst into the police car. A friend of Graham’s brought some orange juice to the car, but the officers refused to let him have it. Finally, Officer Connor received a report that Graham had done nothing wrong at the convenience store, and the officers drove him home and released him.

39011 *39012 At some point during his encounter with the police, Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder; he also claims to have developed a loud ringing in his right ear that continues to this day. He commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the individual officers involved in the incident, all of whom are respondents here,^[1]13 alleging that they had used excessive force in making the investigatory stop, in violation of “rights secured to him under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U. S. C. § 1983.” Complaint ¶ 10, App. 5.^[2]14 The case was tried before a jury. At the close of petitioner’s evidence, respondents moved for a directed verdict. In ruling on that motion, the District Court considered the following four factors, which it identified as “[t]he factors to be considered in determining when the excessive use of force gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983”: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) “[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (WDNC 1986). Finding that the amount of force used by the officers was “appropriate under the circumstances,” that “[t]here was no discernable injury inflicted,” and that the force used “was not applied maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” but in “a good faith effort to maintain or restore order in the face of a potentially explosive 39115 *39116 situation.” id., at 248-249, the District Court granted respondents’ motion for a directed verdict.

Graham brought suit alleging they had used excessive force in making the stop. The court held that the standard for evaluating whether force was excessive was, “objective reasonableness,” and vacated and remanded the decision.

Graham v. Connor looked familiar?

I could not believe it when I read the facts of Graham v. Connor because just recently the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the EEOC for $277,565 where Dollar General terminated a diabetic employee left with very little choice under company policies and decisions made by its employees to drink a $1.69 bottle of orange choose to deal with a diabetic attack and then was promptly terminated for violating company policies. You can see Jon’s write up of the Sixth Circuit affirming the jury verdict here, and the Sixth Circuit’s affirmance of the jury verdict here.

III

Graham v. Connor Thoughts

Graham v. Connor was a 1989 US Supreme Court case. Of course, that means the case was decided prior to the advent of the ADA (signed on July 26, 1990).
Absolutely no doubt in my mind that under the case we discussed here, the police force would be on the hook for damages for violating title II of the ADA.
This case was almost 30 years ago and things have changed considerably, especially with respect to the rights of persons with disabilities. Graham facts may well be excessive today even under an objective reasonableness standard. Even assuming no excessive force claim, if this happened today there undoubtedly would be a successful title II claim as well as a successful Rehabilitation Act claim.

Vos v. City of Newport Beach Introduction and Facts

A much better case that trainers may want to consider using when it comes to excessive force and ADA compliance would be Vos v. City of Newport Beach decided by the Ninth Circuit on June 11, 2018. Here are the facts.

At approximately 8:15 PM on May 29, 2014, plaintiff entered a 711 convenience store. He became very agitated and ran around the store shouting things like, “shoot me already, dog.” A person called 911. For the next six minutes, plaintiff ran around the store cursing at people. Meanwhile, video footage showed other customers going about their business of shopping and checking out at the cash register. The Newport Beach Police Department dispatch stated that the reporting party was advising that the subject was holding a pair of scissors inside the store and there were still people inside. At one point, plaintiff grabbed and immediately released a 711 employee, yelling, “I’ve got a hostage!” An Officer Kresge arrived on the scene and saw the plaintiff behind 7-Eleven’s glass doors yelling, screaming, and pretending to have a gun. He then broadcasted on the police radio that the subject is simulating having a handgun behind his back and is asking me to shoot him. He then asked for backup and specifically asked for a 40 mm less-lethal projectile launcher. As other officers arrived, he informed them that the plaintiff was agitated and likely under the influence of narcotics.

By 8:30 PM, several more officers had arrived. Immediately before the fatal shooting, at least eight officers were present. A trainee armed himself with the requested less-lethal device. The others readied themselves with lethal weapons. There was also a K-9 unit on the scene. Everybody knew that the plaintiff had been simulating having a gun, was agitated, appeared angry, and was potentially mentally unstable and under the influence of drugs. They also heard the plaintiff yell “shoot me,” and other similar cries. The police on site discussed using non-lethal force to subdue the plaintiff both over the radio and among themselves at the scene.

At about 8:43 PM plaintiff open the door of the 711’s back room. As he did so, some officers shouted doors opening. Plaintiff then ran around the front check out counter and towards the open doors holding an object over his head in his hand. At that point, there was about 30 feet in distance between the plaintiff and the officers. One officer shouted that the plaintiff had scissors. Over the public address system, Officer Preasmyer twice told the plaintiff to drop the weapon. When he did not drop the weapon that kept charging toward the officers, Officer Preasmyer then shouted shoot him. All the officers then opened up fire shooting the plaintiff four times whereupon he died from his wounds. During the 20 minutes from when the officers arrived until the plaintiff ran at them, the officer did not communicate with the plaintiff. The officers who fired the lethal weaponry did not know that another officer had fired non-lethal weaponry. Testimony also said that they saw a metallic object, which they believed to be scissors. When the plaintiff’s blood was later tested, it came up positive for both amphetamine and methamphetamine. His medical history later revealed that he was a schizophrenic. Plaintiff’s parents sued the City of Newport for violating §1983 (excessive force), and for violating title II of the ADA and for violating the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. They also filed claims under California State law as well. The District Court granted summary judgment to the City of Newport and the plaintiff appealed.

Vos Court’s Reasoning Excessive Force

The standard for determining whether the force was excessive is Graham v. Connor’s objectively reasonable standard.
Whether force is objectively reasonable involves balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s fourth amendment interests against the governmental interests at stake.
Use of deadly force implicates the highest level of fourth amendment interests because the suspect has a fundamental interest in his own life and because that kind of force frustrates the interests of the individual and of society in having the judiciary determine guilt and punishment.
Assessing the government’s interest means looking to: the severity of the crime at issue; whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
The officers were not responding to the report of a crime, rather they were there because of plaintiff’s erratic behavior.
Once the officers were at the scene, plaintiff had little opportunity to flee.
There were simply not reasonable grounds to suggest that the police officers could have perceived an immediate threat from the plaintiff to themselves requiring deadly force. More particularly: the officers had surrounded the front door to the 711; they had established positions behind cover their police vehicles, they outnumbered the plaintiff 8 to 1; even though plaintiff charged the officers, the officer did not believe he had a gun, and they had less-lethal methods available to stop the plaintiff from charging; and the plaintiff was within the range of a less-lethal weapon, a Taser, or a K-9 when he was shot.
Other relevant factors in deciding whether deadly force is warranted include the availability of less intrusive force, whether proper warnings were given, and whether it should have been apparent to the officer that the subject of the force used was mentally disturbed. Here, the officers had upwards of 15 minutes to create a perimeter, assemble less-lethal means, coordinate a plan for the use of force, establish cover, and, arguably, attempt to communicate with the plaintiff. Also, it was really clear that the plaintiff was mentally unstable, acting out, and at times even inviting officer to use deadly force on him. Those indications of mental illness diminished the government’s interest in using deadly force. Indeed, six of the officers were aware and prepared to respond by using only non-lethal weapons.
Since existing precedent was not beyond debate that the officers acted unreasonably, the officers get qualified immunity for their actions (of course, that doesn’t help the City of Newport at all).

Court’s Reasoning ADA

The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act applies to arrests. See this blog entry.
The officers had time and opportunity to assess the situation and employ accommodations identified by the parents, such as de-escalation, communication, or get specialized help.
The facts show that further accommodation was possible.
The same factual questions preventing the determination of whether the police officers engaged reasonably with respect to excessive force also informed the question of whether they provided reasonable accommodations. Those concerns also undercut the City of Newport’s argument that the plaintiff posed an immediate threat, i.e. a direct threat, and was not entitled to accommodation.
For the reasons discussed in the court’s discussion of excessive force as well as for the reasons discussed in this section of the blog entry, VI, the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

VII

Takeaways

For trainers that are using Graham v. Connor as the basis for training police on excessive force, reconsider, especially in light of the Sixth Circuit affirmance of the jury verdict in the Dollar General case. By using Graham, trainers are communicating to the police that they have wide latitude with excessive force and implicitly suggesting that they are off the hook otherwise. That is simply not the case. Graham v. Connor is a clear violation of title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
A much better case to use than Graham v. Connor is Vos v. City of Newport Beach.
While the police officers were given qualified immunity so that they did not face individual liability. That is a one off because now the case law is clear beyond debate that officers simply can’t behave the way they did in Graham v. Connor, let alone in Vos v. City of Newport Beach.
It is clear that whenever you have an excessive force case combined with a person with a disability being subject to that force, you will have both excessive force claims and title II/Rehabilitation Act claims to deal with simultaneously. Whether the employer of the police officers will face damages, will depend upon this blog entry.
Qualified immunity is a one off. That is, an individual officer might get qualified immunity, but if the case goes against the officer’s employer, then it can be said that the precedent may be beyond debate and the next officer will not be so lucky. Also, civil cases may inform that analysis. Certainly, Graham v. Connor if it came up today would not only subject the police force to title II liability, Rehabilitation Act liability, and excessive force liability, it would also be unlikely that the police officers would get qualified immunity.
With respect to excessive force, the police should not limit themselves to the factors in Graham v. Connor. They should also consider the other relevant factors mentioned in Vos as well.

Litigation over commas: How far Does Title II Extend?

April 16, 2018 by William Goren Leave a Comment

My colleague, Jon Hyman, has previously written about what can happen when commas are not used when they should be. You can find that blog entry here. Today’s blog entry raises the question as to what happens when a comma is used when perhaps it shouldn’t have been. The case is Haberle v. Troxell, decided by the Third Circuit on March 20, 2018, and it deals with the question of accessibility upon arrests. The case had various issues, but we are only going to focus on the ADA issue. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning allowing amending of ADA portion of complaint; and takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

Facts

Timothy Nixon had a variety of mental health problems, including longtime depression. He lived off and on with his longtime partner and their two children. On May 20^th, 2013, Nixon had a serious mental health episode involving severe depression and called his longtime partner saying that he was suicidal. He then broke into her friend’s home and took a handgun. He next went to his cousin’s apartment. Fearing for Nixon’s life, Nixon’s partner contacted the Borough of Nazareth Police Department where police officer Troxell obtained a warrant for Nixon’s arrest and then went with other officers to Nixon’s cousin apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment, some of the officers suggested setting up a perimeter and asking the Pennsylvania State police to send in crisis negotiators. Other officers suggested asking Nixon’s partner to help communicate with Nixon. Troxell turned away all those suggestions calling the other officers, “ a bunch of f—ing pussies.” He declared his intention to immediately go to the apartment because that is how they do things in Nazareth. He did exactly that, knocked on the door the apartment, and identified himself as a police officer. Nixon then promptly went into one of the bedrooms of the apartment, turned the stolen gun on himself, and killed himself. According to Nixon’s partner, Nixon was not a danger to anyone and was peacefully drinking beer with his cousin when the police knocked on the door. That said, no allegations were made that Troxell knew what was happening inside the apartment when he knocked. Nixon’s partner then sued alleging a myriad of causes of action, including violation of title II of the ADA.

Court’s Reasoning Allowing Amendment of ADA Portion of Complaint

The ADA does generally apply when police officers make an arrest.
In order to state a claim under title II of the ADA, a plaintiff has to demonstrate: 1) he or she is a qualified individual; 2) with a disability; 3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, program, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; 4) by reason of his or her disability.
An ADA violation occurs if and when a disabled individual is excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, program, or activities of the public entity, or is subjected to discrimination by any such entity. So, it is the denial giving rise to the claim.
Nothing categorically excludes people who are arrested from the ADA’s broad coverage. So, people who are arrested can be qualified individuals under the ADA, though not always.
Arrestees certainly may have a disability covered by the ADA.
If the arrestee’s disability plays a role in the decision-making process and has a determinative effect on the outcome of that process, i.e., if the arrestee’s disability was a “but for,” cause in the deprivation or harm he suffered, then causation is satisfied.
Police departments fall squarely within the statutory definition of a public entity.
Persuasive precedents indicate that the ADA’s reference to the services, program, and activities of a public entity must be interpreted broadly to encompass virtually everything that a public entity does.
42 U.S.C. §12132 as phrased makes it unnecessary to figure out whether arrests are a service, program, or activity of a public entity since the very last clause is a catchall phrase prohibiting all discrimination by a public entity regardless of the context.
Discrimination under the ADA includes not only adverse action motivated by prejudice against persons with disabilities, but also includes failing to make reasonable accommodations for plaintiff’s disabilities.
The catchall phrase means that police officers may violate the ADA when making arrests by failing to provide reasonable accommodation for a qualified arrestee’s disability thereby subjecting him to discrimination.
While there is some disagreement in the courts concerning the point during a law enforcement encounter at which the ADA applies to police conduct, no Court of Appeals has held that the ADA does not apply at all.
While plaintiff cannot show deliberate indifference and so the complaint fails with respect to damages, allegations could have been made to show deliberate indifference. Those allegations could have included facts suggesting that existing policy caused the failure to adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like Nixon’s. It might have also included facts indicating that the risk of calculable harm was so great and so obvious that the risk and failure to respond alone supports a finding of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Nixon’s partner should be given an opportunity to amend her complaint since it could not be definitively said that amendment would be futile.

III

Takeaways:

42 U.S.C. §12132 actually states: “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
As an attorney who has done a lot of contracts work over the years, the biggest issue that a contracts attorney deals with when drafting contracts is the difference between parenthetical and restrictive. That is, if information is parenthetical, it is not something that has to be done but could be. On the other hand, if information is restrictive, then it is something that has to be done. Where a phrase is surrounded by commas, the information is parenthetical. If commas are missing, then the information is restrictive. With respect to the actual wording of 42 U.S.C. §12132 it isn’t clear to my mind whether the very last clause is parenthetical because it is surrounded by a comma and a period. It would be an easier call if it was surrounded by commas, then it would be clearly parenthetical. The phrasing of the statute makes it unclear. If no comma appeared after “public entity,” then clearly, “or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity” would be restrictive and an additional requirement. However, the comma is there, which creates in my mind, the argument that it might be parenthetical. On the other hand, if it is indeed the Oxford comma, which Jon discusses in the above-mentioned blog entry, then you get to the same place as it being an additional requirement. So, in this situation, if it is indeed an additional requirement, the drafters would have been better off leaving out the last comma in the series.
Why am I making such a big deal over this comma? The answer is because until this case, I have not seen a title II case talk about accessibility in any other way besides programs, services, and activities. The issue doesn’t come up that often because as the court mentions, title II has been held to apply to virtually everything that a public entity does. Even so, this case says that there is more to it.
Expect this case to be used by plaintiff’s attorneys to say that even if they cannot show that a program, service, or activity is involved, it doesn’t matter because public entities cannot discriminate against people with disabilities even where there is no program, service, or activity.
If the last phrase is indeed a catchall provision going beyond program, services, and activities, then why is the phrase, “program, services, and activities” in there at all?
We have previously discussed Sheehan here. In that decision, both parties told the Court that the ADA does apply to arrests and so the Court didn’t deal with that issue when it decided that certiorari had been improvidently granted.
This case is going to be very interesting to follow because it takes the ADA to a place I have not seen before. One wonders whether the arrests issue will be appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In that eventuality, I don’t even want to hazard a guess at the how the Court will go.
Preventive law would demand focusing on program, services, and activities first with respect to title II compliance. If somehow the situation does not seem to involve a program, service, or activity, then you do want to think about accommodating the person anyway under the so-called catchall phrase. Remember, title II case law is very clear that the ADA applies to just about everything a public entity does. Alternatively, you could elect as a public entity to stand your ground and claim that the last phrase is parenthetical as described above, but that might be expensive.
It isn’t clear from this decision whether the court is looking at causation in terms of mixed motive or but for. They do use the term “but for,” but they also used the phrase, “disability plays a role in the decision-making process….” The reader may want to review this blog entry of mine discussing causation when it comes to the ADA.
Moral of the story is that you can’t be cavalier about when you use commas. That is, there is the Oxford comma, but maybe sometimes it is better off not following that rule strictly and remembering that commas also deal with the issue of restrictive and parenthetical information.

Compliance with the ADA When Arresting and Qualified Immunity

July 27, 2016 by William Goren Leave a Comment

Today’s case discusses the issue of just when is an arrest out of compliance with the ADA. There is also a nice little bonus of qualified immunity as well. The case is Trujillo v. Rio Arriba County ex rel. Rio Arriba County Sheriff’s Department, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96797 (D. N.M. June 15, 2016). We know from this blog entry that arrests are subject to the ADA. This case goes further by talking about when might an arrest be out of compliance with the ADA. The case is actually a discovery dispute, but there is some excellent analysis and discussion of when an arrest might be out of compliance with the ADA as well as a discussion of just how far qualified immunity goes. As is my usual practice, the blog entry is divided into categories: facts; issues; court’s reasoning with respect to when is an arrest out of compliance with the ADA; court’s reasoning with respect to the County’s qualified immunity; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

Facts

The plaintiff, an honorably discharged veteran of the United States Army, suffered from degenerative joint disease in his knees, nephropathy, and end-stage renal disease associated with diabetes mellitus. At approximately 7 PM on August 22, 2013, the plaintiff was stopped while at a driving while intoxicated checkpoint where an officer asked him to perform sobriety tests. Because of his disability, the plaintiff asked the officer if he could retrieve his walking cane from the trunk of his car. The officer denied him the opportunity to retrieve his cane even though the plaintiff repeatedly attempted to explain to the officer that he had a physical disability and offered to produce his handicap placard to prove his physical limitations. The officer noted that the plaintiff struggled to perform various walking and standing tests and that he was informed by the plaintiff that the plaintiff had knee problems and other ailments that prevented him from performing the tests adequately. The officer eventually arrested the plaintiff for driving under the influence of alcohol and kept him in handcuffs until the plaintiff’s daughter paid his bail around midnight. Throughout the encounter, the plaintiff was only allowed out of the handcuffs in order to sign paperwork related to his arrest. The plaintiff brought civil rights and tort claims against the County and the two individual officers in their individual capacities. For our purposes, we are particularly interested in the ADA claims against the County where the plaintiff claimed that he was denied the benefits of services, programs, and activities of the Department of Public Safety with respect to: 1) an encounter with an officer properly trained to deal with citizens suffering from service related disability; and 2) being treated with dignity by the government entities in that the County failed to provide adequate accommodation for persons with disabilities while conducting field sobriety tests and when he was placed in jail.

Issues:

Just when is an arrest out of compliance with the ADA?
Can the County claim qualified immunity?

III

Court’s Reasoning with Respect to When Is an Arrest Out Of Compliance with the ADA

Drawing on a case from the 10^th Circuit (Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10^th 1999), and one from the Fourth Circuit adopting the 10^th Circuit’s reasoning (Waller ex rel Estate of Hunt v. Danville, 556 F.3d 171 (4^th Cir. 2009), there were two possible theories under which federal courts have addressed claims under the ADA arising from arrests: 1) where police wrongly arrest someone with a disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; and 2) where police properly investigate and arrest the person with a disability for crimes unrelated to the disability but fail to reasonably accommodate that person’s disability in the course of the investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.
With respect to wrongful arrest, a plaintiff must establish three things: 1) the plaintiff was a person with a disability; 2) the arresting officers knew or should have known that the plaintiff had a disability; and 3) the defendant arrested the plaintiff because of legal conduct related to the plaintiff’s disability.
With respect to whether arresting officers knew or should have known that the plaintiff had a disability, that means the arresting officer must know or have reason to know that the arrestee is a person with a disability.
The essence of the reasonable accommodation during arrest theory is that once the police have a situation under control, the police have a duty to accommodate a disability.

Court’s Reasoning with Respect to the County’s Qualified Immunity

Since the Sheriff’s department through the County is not being sued in its individual capacity but only vicariously, qualified immunity, which only applies to individual capacity suits, is not available.

Takeaways:

This case puts some meat on the bone so to speak with respect to how you would go about proving up a case involving an arrest that may be out of compliance with the ADA. With respect to the wrongful arrest theory, we now have the elements of a prima facie case.
With respect failure to provide a reasonable accommodation when arresting theory, Trujillo and the cases Trujillo is based upon (here and here), do not lay out the prima facie case for such a claim. However, from reading these cases, we might be able to hazard a guess as to what a prima facie claim for lack of a reasonable accommodations when arresting someone might look like, namely: 1) plaintiff had a disability; 2) the arresting officers knew or should have known that the plaintiff was a person with disability; 3) plaintiff suggested to the officer a reasonable accommodation; and 4) the officer ignored that request or did not engage in any effort to explore what reasonable accommodations might work. Keep in mind, this theory only applies after the scene has been secured by the police.
With respect to qualified immunity, it does not apply where a person or entity is not being sued in an individual capacity. So, plaintiff’s attorneys may want to consider that in structuring their complaint.
A governmental entity can be vicariously liable under title II of the ADA where their employees violate the ADA.